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Abstract 
The issue of regulation for mandated network neutrality is currently live in both the 
United States and the European Union. Traditionally, the models applied have been of 
the command and control or market regulation variety. Both approaches have been 
extensively criticised and both have suffered setbacks in recent years. This paper 
suggests it is time to abandon our experiments with traditional business regulation 
models and move to a principled approach for network neutrality. This principled 
approach, based upon the rights to privacy, expression and freedom to carry on a 
business, identifies the Internet as a public good which requires to be protected from 
interference if we are to fully realise its democratic potential. The proposed principled, 
or rights-based, approach to net neutrality would see regulations for network neutrality 
based in principles of fundamental rights and not business or market regulation 
principles. We believe this would be a radical new model for network neutrality 
regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
The Internet is much more than a platform to post pictures of cute cats and silly 
videos. It has vital democratic and cultural functions1 and should be considered a 
public good to which open and free access is a fundamental right.2 The development 
of technologies such as intelligent routers and smart protocols, however, have led to 
telecommunications companies developing the capacity to manage their network for 
quality of service (QoS) purposes. The customer has driven much of the demand for 
this. As we make greater and more intensive demands upon our digital 
telecommunications network, the operators of that network have been driven by QoS 
requirements. The extensive demand that high definition video on demand (VoD) 
makes on network capacity3 has led to tussles between Netflix, the leading provider of 
such content, and some network providers.4 In addition greater demand for services 
with little latency tolerance such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) put pressure 
on telecommunications providers to offer high QoS.5 As Pujolle and Gaïti observe:  
As user needs are becoming increasingly various, demanding and customised, 
IP networks and more generally telecommunication networks have to evolve 
in order to satisfy these requirements. That is, a network has to integrate more 
quality of service, mobility, dynamicity, service adaptation, etc. This evolution 
will make users satisfied, but it will surely create more complexity in the 
network generating difficulties in the control process.6  
Such QoS systems run counter to the core network principle of end-to-end 
communications, whereby the intelligence of the network lies only at the two ends of 
a particular communication, rather than in the route it takes to get from one end to the 
                                                 
1 On the democratic function of the Internet, see E Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace 
Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility (Cambridge: CUP, 2015); L Dahlberg and E 
Siapera (eds) Radical Democracy and the Internet: Interrogating Theory and Practice (London: 
MacMillan, 2007). On the Internet and culture, see T Streeter, The Net Effect: Romanticism, 
Capitalism, and the Internet (New York: NYU Press, 2010); B Danet and SC Herring (eds) The 
Multilingual Internet: Language, Culture, and Communication Online (Oxford: OUP, 2007).  
2 See Laidlaw, ibid. See also N Lucchi, “Access to Network Services and Protection of Constitutional 
Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet Access for the Freedom of Expression” (2011) 19 
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 645. 
3 According to data analysts Sandline, Netflix accounted for 36.5% of all downstream Internet 
bandwidth during peak periods in North America for March 2015. In same time period, YouTube 
accounted for 15.6% of downstream Internet traffic, web browsing was 6%, Facebook was 2.7%, 
Amazon Instant Video was 2.0% and Hulu was 1.9%. See T Spangler, “Netflix Bandwidth Usage 
Climbs to Nearly 37% of Internet Traffic at Peak Hours” (Variety 28 May 2015).  
4 Netflix Media Center, “Netflix Applauds Appeals Court Ruling on Net Neutrality” (14 June 2016) 
available at https://media.netflix.com/en/press-releases/netflix-applauds-appeals-court-ruling-on-net-
neutrality (accessed 12 Aug 16); J Brodkin, “Cable group: Net neutrality rules for Netflix! (But not for 
us)” (Ars Technica, 28 March 2016) available at http://arstechnica.com/business/2016/03/cable-group-
net-neutrality-rules-for-netflix-but-not-for-us/ (accessed 12 Aug 16).  
5 K Gonia, SANS Institute Reading Room, “Latency and QoS for Voice over IP” (2004) available at 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/voip/latency-qos-voice-ip-1349 (accessed 12 Aug 16).   
6 G Pujolle and D Gaïti, “Intelligent Routers and Smart Protocols” in FA Aagesen, C Anutariya and V  
Wuwongse (eds) Intelligence in Communications Systems (London: Springer, 1998). 
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other.7 This concept has become embedded into the cultural and then legal concept of 
‘net neutrality’, which dictates that “data packets on the Internet should be moved 
impartially, without regard to content, destination or source”,8 and so risk endangering 
the open character of the Internet.  
Against this backdrop, mandating network neutrality through regulation is seen as 
crucial to the protection of fundamental human rights and to ensure fair competition 
and innovation. Proponents of such regulation argue that it promotes freedom and 
enhances network access.9 Although there are many, especially in the 
telecommunications industry, who continue to question the value of mandated 
network neutrality, the mainstream literature in regulation and governance has moved 
towards its acceptance.10 The question is no longer should we regulate to protect net 
neutrality, but how should we do it? This paper proposes a new approach, one which 
departs from the institutionalist command and control, and competition-based 
approaches, which up to this point have been the dominant models, applied in the 
United States and the European Union. We recommend a new model: a principled 
approach. Before then though we begin by examining the current institutionalist 
approaches.  
2. The Institutionalist Approach to Net Neutrality  
The net neutrality debate began in the United States when high-profile proponents of 
mandated network neutrality, including Professor Lawrence Lessig, Professor Sir Tim 
Berners-Lee, Professor Tim Wu, and Craigslist founder Craig Newmark supported a 
proposal for a federal net neutrality law.11 This movement met some degree of success 
when, in 2006, Senators Byron Dorgan and Olympia Snowe introduced the Internet 
Freedom Preservation Bill (or Dorgan-Snowe Bill)12 which sought to legally enshrine 
the principle of net neutrality. The Bill though quickly became bogged down amid 
claims from the telecommunications industry that Dorgan-Snowe was 
disproportionate as there was no evidence that industry self-regulation was failing, 
that its effect would be to protect Internet giants like Microsoft, Google, Yahoo! and 
eBay rather than their customers and that it would deter investment by telecoms 
companies in high-speed data networks as they would not be able to recover their 
costs. The Bill fizzled out in summer 2006 when it failed to clear a congressional 
                                                 
7 JH Saltzer, DP Reed and DD Clark, “End-to-end arguments in system design” (1984) 2 ACM 
Transactions on Computer Systems 277-288. 
8 A Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and Society 3ed, (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 26. 
9 T Wu, “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination”, (2003) 2 Journal of Telecommunications and 
High Technology Law 141-179. 
10 C Marsden, Net Neutrality (Bloomsbury, London 2010); T Wu, The Master Switch (London: 
Atlantic, 2012); L Belli and P De Filippi (eds) Net Neutrality Compendium: Human Rights, Free 
Competition and the Future of the Internet (London: Springer, 2015). 
11 T Wu and L Lessig, “Ex Parte Submission in CS Docket No. 02-52” (22 August 2003) available at 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/sites/default/files/resources/wu_lessig_fcc.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16); T 
Berners-Lee, “Net Neutrality: This is serious” (21 June 2006)  available at 
http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/144; C Newmark, “Keep the Internet neutral, fair and free” 
(CNN, 20 October 2006) available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/06/09/newmark.internet/index.html (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
12 S 215. 
(2016) 13:2 SCRIPTed 
 
121 
vote, a fate that also befell the Internet Freedom Preservation Bill of 2008.13 
Undeterred, the campaigners continued to press for action. 
2. 1. Command and Control  
In 2007, it became apparent that one of the giant US cable companies, Comcast, was 
interfering with the ability of their cable modem customers to access BitTorrent 
services by resetting services that used BitTorrent packets. They were doing this as a 
traffic management tool to prevent BitTorrent using up all available upstream 
bandwidth to the detriment of other customers. They were referred to the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) by two public advocacy groups, Free Press and 
Public Knowledge. The complaint stated that Comcast’s actions violated the FCC 
Internet Policy Statement, particularly violating the statement’s principle that 
“consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice . . . [and] 
to run applications and use services of their choice”. Comcast defended its 
interference as necessary intervention to manage scarce network capacity. In August 
2008 the FCC published the results of its investigation. They found that Comcast’s 
bandwidth management methods contravened federal policy by “significantly 
impeding consumers’ ability to access the content and use the applications of their 
choice”.14 By the time the order was issued, Comcast had adopted new management 
methods and, as a result, the order effectively only required Comcast to disclose the 
details of those new methods and their implementation. Comcast agreed to comply 
with the order but also filed for review in the District of Columbia Circuit of the US 
Court of Appeals, claiming (among other things) that the FCC did not have 
jurisdiction over its network management methods. 
Buoyed by their initial success in regulating Comcast, the FCC decided to seek public 
input on a new set of draft rules that would codify and supplement existing principles 
to safeguard Internet openness. After holding a series of reviews and public meetings, 
the FCC adopted the Open Internet Report and Order in December 2010.15 The order, 
which took effect on 20 November 2011, established three basic open Internet rules 
designed to preserve the free and open Internet. These are: (1) Transparency—
broadband providers must disclose information regarding their network management 
practices, performance and the commercial terms of their broadband services; (2) No 
blocking—fixed broadband providers (such as DSL, cable modem or fixed wireless 
providers) may not block lawful content, applications, services or non-harmful 
devices, and mobile broadband providers may not block lawful websites, or 
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services; and (3) No 
unreasonable discrimination—fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably 
discriminate in transmitting lawful network traffic over a consumer’s broadband 
Internet access service. Unreasonable discrimination of network traffic could take the 
form of particular services or websites appearing slower or degraded in quality. 
                                                 
13 HR 3458. 
14 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications 23 FCCR 13,028 at 13,054 (2008). 
15 Federal Communications Commission, “Preserving the Open Internet; Final Rule” 76 (185) Federal 
Register 59192 (2011).  
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While the FCC had been busy doing this the appeal in Comcast had been heard by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. In April 2010, the court 
vacated the FCC’s order, holding that the FCC had no authority over Comcast’s 
Internet service because “the Commission had failed to tie its assertion of ancillary 
authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any ‘statutorily mandated 
responsibility’”.16 In essence, the FCC had been found to have acted ultra vires as 
they had no mandate or authority to interfere with network management capability as 
such interference was not ancillary to their primary statutory role. This decision 
suggests that any attempt to actually enforce the Open Internet Report and Order 
would be fruitless as applying Comcast, the FCC have no authority to intervene in 
network and traffic management. If this were true, the Open Internet Report and 
Order becomes merely a guideline, not an order; however, things are not so clear-cut. 
It has been noted by one commentator that “the impact of this decision on the FCC’s 
ability to regulate broadband services and implement its broadband policy goals 
remains unclear”17 while the then FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski commented in 
April 2010: “The court decision earlier this week does not change our broadband 
policy goals, or the ultimate authority of the FCC to act to achieve those goals. The 
court did not question the FCC’s goals; it merely invalidated one technical, legal 
mechanism for broadband policy chosen by prior Commissions.”18 The Chairman 
made this statement while announcing the next stage of the FCC’s broadband, 
including net neutrality, policy which included the adoption of the Open Internet 
Order. As may therefore have been expected, the efficacy of the Open Internet Report 
and Order was immediately challenged by a number of telecommunications 
companies, including Verizon and MetroPCS.19 All these challenges were eventually 
consolidated into a single review before the US Court of Appeals for the Circuit of the 
District of Columbia.20 In the consolidated action, the telecommunications companies 
argued that the Comcast decision rendered the FCC Open Internet Order ultra vires 
and in the alternative that it interfered with their First Amendment rights.  
The Court issued its ruling in January 2014.21 The Court began by framing its terms of 
reference: “our task as a reviewing court is not to assess the wisdom of the Open 
Internet Order regulations, but rather to determine whether the Commission has 
demonstrated that the regulations fall within the scope of its statutory grant of 
authority.”22 The Court then broke the Order up into its constituent parts and either 
vacated or upheld each part. Applying Comcast (among other authorities) the Court 
found that an earlier decision of the FCC to classify broadband providers as 
                                                 
16 Comcast Corp. v FCC, 600 F 3d 642, 661 (2010). 
17 AA Gilroy, Access to Broadband Networks: The Net Neutrality Debate Congressional Research 
Service R40616, 4 (16 April 2015). Available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40616.pdf (accessed 12 
Aug 16.   
18 FCC, FCC Announces Broadband Action Agenda (8 April 2010). Available at  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297402A1.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
19 Verizon v. FCC, Case No. 11-1014 (D.C. Cir. January 20, 2011); MetroPCS Communications et al. v. 
FCC, Case No. 11-1016 (D.C. Cir. January 24, 2011).  
20 Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid, 17. 
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“information services” and not “telecommunication services” meant that broadband 
service providers were not subject to so-called common carrier regulation under Title 
II of the Communications Act 1934.23 The effect of this was to render invalid the 
provisions of the Open Internet Order on anti-discrimination and anti-blocking as “the 
Commission has failed to establish that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules 
do not impose per se common carrier obligations.”24 The decision to vacate the key 
anti-blocking and anti-discrimination provisions gutted the Open Internet Order of its 
capacity to enshrine and protect net neutrality, leaving only the provision on 
transparency, but brought about quite unexpected consequences and the next round of 
attempts to enshrine net neutrality through regulation in the United States.   
While the telecommunications companies reacted positively to the outcome of the 
case by making announcements that they would not seek to interfere with the 
customer Internet experience provided by an open Internet,25 pressure was quickly 
brought to bear on the US Federal government by free Internet advocates. A petition 
was launched on the White House petitions site calling upon the Obama 
administration to “Restore Net Neutrality By Directing the FCC to Classify Internet 
Providers as ‘Common Carriers’”. It quickly received over 105,000 signatures.26 In 
response, the White House replied that “preserving an open Internet is vital not just to 
the free flow of information, but also to promoting innovation and economic 
productivity”, but cautioned that “the FCC is an independent agency” and therefore 
the President was not able to mandate the FCC to take any action.27  
While the petition was open for signatures, the new FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler 
issued a statement responding to the Verizon decision. In this he stated that the FCC 
would not appeal the decision, but instead would establish new rules for transparency, 
non-discrimination, and anti-blocking, based on the decision.28 With the petition 
quickly gathering signatories, the White House became fully engaged. Despite the 
fact that the President had no power to mandate the FCC, he leveraged political 
pressure when he made a statement calling upon the FCC to “implement the strongest 
possible rules to protect net neutrality” and setting out four bright line rules which he 
suggested “reflect the Internet you and I use every day, and that some ISPs already 
observe”: no blocking, no throttling, increased transparency, and no paid 
prioritization.29 On 26 February 2015 the FCC issued a new 2015 Open Internet Rules 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 9. 
24 Ibid per Tatel CJ at 4. 
25 J Lowensohn, “Comcast, Verizon, and others promise net neutrality ruling won’t hurt customers” 
(The Verge, 14 January 2014) Available at www.theverge.com/2014/1/14/5309268/comcast-verizon-
and-others-promise-net-neutrality-ruling-wont-hurt (accessed 12 Aug 16).   
26 (15 January 2014) available at https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/petition/restore-net-neutrality-
directing-fcc-classify-internet-providers-common-carriers (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
27 Ibid.   
28 FCC, Statement by FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler on the FCC's Open Internet Rules (19 February 
2014). Available at www.fcc.gov/document/statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-
rules (accessed 12 Aug 16).  
29 White House, Net Neutrality: President Obama's Plan for a Free and Open Internet (10 November 
2014). Available at www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
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and Order.30 The order firstly deals with the Verizon decision by reclassifying 
broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service under Title II of 
the Communications Act of 1934.31 The Commission justify this, not only as a 
response to Verizon but because “our reclassification of the broadband Internet access 
service means that we can regulate, consistent with the Communications Act, 
broadband providers to the extent they are ‘engaged’ in providing the broadband 
Internet access service.”32 In essence the argument made by the Commission is that in 
the modern world consumers see broadband providers as being similar to 
telecommunications providers of old; common carriers who are responsible for 
carrying and delivering our Internet content from point to point. While this may not 
be technically true (the moment our email leaves our ISPs servers anyone can be 
carrying it by any route) it is how broadband providers advertise themselves by 
promoting download (and to a lesser extent upload) speeds and network security. 
Thus, as far as the consumer is concerned, their broadband provider is the party 
responsible for delivering their email and making sure they can get access to Netflix. 
As the Commission notes:  
The representation to retail customers that they will be able to reach “all or 
substantially all Internet endpoints” necessarily includes the promise to make 
the interconnection arrangements necessary to allow that access. As a 
telecommunications service, broadband Internet access service implicitly 
includes an assertion that the broadband provider will make just and 
reasonable efforts to transmit and deliver its customers’ traffic to and from “all 
or substantially all Internet endpoints” under sections 201 and 202 of the Act . 
. . Thus, disputes involving a provider of broadband Internet access service 
regarding Internet traffic exchange arrangements that interfere with the 
delivery of a broadband Internet access service end user’s traffic are subject to 
our authority under Title II of the Act.33  
 
Having secured a reason to regulate broadband providers under Title II the Order sets 
out a new 2015 series of bright line rules, based upon President Obama’s statement: 
(1) No blocking—A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network 
management; (2) No throttling—A person engaged in the provision of broadband 
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or 
degrade lawful Internet traffic on the basis of Internet content, application, or service, 
or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network management; (3) No 
Paid prioritization—A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid prioritization; 
and (4) No unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage standard for 
Internet conduct—Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access 
                                                 
30 FCC15-24: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
31 Ibid, 59.  
32 Ibid, 339.  
33 Ibid, 204. 
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service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or 
unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users’ ability to select, access, and use broadband 
Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services, or devices 
of their choice, or (ii) edge providers’ ability to make lawful content, applications, 
services, or devices available to end users. Reasonable network management shall not 
be considered a violation of this rule.34 In addition to the four basic open Internet rules 
found in the 2015 Rules, it should be remembered that the transparency provision of 
the 2010 rules remains in effect giving us five basic open Internet rules in total.35  
The rules took effect on 12 June 2015 but as may be expected, before they took effect, 
they were challenged by broadband providers. A petition was filed by the United 
States Telecom Association (USTA) claiming that:  
Broadband Internet access fits squarely within the 1996 [Telecommunications] 
Act’s definition of “information service[s],” 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), that may not 
be regulated as common carriage under Title II. And Congress explicitly stated 
that the term “information service” “includ[es] specifically a service . . . that 
provides access to the Internet.” § 230(f)(2)’ and that the FCC has tried ‘to 
evade [the] Court’s holding in Verizon.36 
 The claim goes on to suggest that the whole action of the FCC is illegal as well as 
substantively invalid:  
The Order is independently unlawful because the FCC — in its headlong rush 
to implement this regulatory sea change at the President’s urging — 
committed a string of glow-in-the-dark [Administrative Procedure Act] 
violations, any one of which would suffice to invalidate the Order. The FCC’s 
original proposal to adopt a handful of prophylactic rules gave no notice that 
the FCC intended to craft out of whole cloth a “Title II tailored for the 21st 
Century”, to rewrite its rules concerning mobile services, to redefine 
fundamentally the broadband service that it reclassified, or to adopt an 
amorphous “Standard for Internet Conduct”, which gives the agency 
unfettered discretion to regulate new and innovative offerings. And the FCC 
abandoned its own longstanding classification decisions without grappling 
with either its prior legal conclusions and factual findings or the billions of 
dollars invested in reliance on prior policy.37  
 
                                                 
34 Ibid, 15-22. 
35 Ibid, 23- 24.  
36 United States Telecom Association v FCC & Ors. CA D.C. Filed13/5/2015, 2. Available at  
www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/15.05.13_Motion_for_Stay.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16).  
37 Ibid, 3. 
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Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed the legality of 
the Order.38 In a controversial decision, and by a 2-1 majority, the Court upheld the 
order in full finding that the FCC had the proper authority to reclassify broadband 
Internet under the Title II. In their controversial opinion the Court stated that:  
The problem in Verizon was not that the Commission had misclassified the 
service between carriers and edge providers but that the Commission had 
failed to classify broadband service as a Title II service at all. The 
Commission overcame this problem in the Order by reclassifying broadband 
service — and the interconnection arrangements necessary to provide it — as 
a telecommunications service.39  
While campaigners in favour of mandated net neutrality have welcomed the 
decision,40 opponents of the Order have pointed out that the Court appeared to have 
developed a circular argument without resolution by finding that “the FCC’s rules 
prohibit internet providers from deciding what content they are willing to publish or 
distribute — an ‘invasion of a legally protected interest’ that implicates internet 
service providers’ First Amendment rights” while holding that “this abridgment of 
internet providers’ First Amendment rights is permissible.”41 It seems highly likely 
that for this reason alone this case will be appealed to the Supreme Court and 
therefore we cannot yet treat the issue as settled in the United States.  
2. 2. Market Regulation 
The issue of mandated network neutrality is not only an American one. The issue is 
equally economically important, although until recently arguably less politicised, in 
Europe. One of the reasons the issue was less political was a greater array of 
consumer choice on the European market for Internet access. In the US, fixed-line 
broadband access was, and is, most commonly achieved via a cable provider. This 
means that for many subscribers they have a limited choice of perhaps only two or 
three (or even one) Internet access providers. In the EU most people got, and still get, 
their fixed-line access over digital subscriber lines or DSL (more commonly known as 
telephone lines). This means that the average European consumer has a choice of 
several access providers. In the UK, for example, Ofcom lists over fifty competing 
fixed-line service providers,42 although admittedly most home users get their home 
broadband access from the ‘big five’ providers: BT/PlusNet, Sky Broadband, Virgin 
                                                 
38 United States Telecom Association v FCC & Ors. CA D.C. No. 15-1063, 14 June 2016. Available at 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/3F95E49183E6F8AF85257FD200505A3A/%24fil
e/15-1063-1619173.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
39 Ibid, 54-55. 
40 C. Kang, “Court Backs Rules Treating Internet as Utility, Not Luxury” (The New York Times, 14 
June 2016). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-appeals-
court-ruling.html (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
41 F. Campbell, “Court's Net Neutrality Opinion Wrong About First Amendment” (Forbes, 22 July 
2016). Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/fredcampbell/2016/07/22/courts-net-neutrality-
opinion-wrong-about-first-amendment/ (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
42 Ofcom, “List of ISP Signatories to the 2010 Code” available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/codes-of-practice/broadband-speeds-cop-2010/list-of-isps-
2010 (accessed 12 Aug 16)  
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Media, TalkTalk, and EE.43 The end-user can change their ISP simply by requesting 
their new provider to change the service over to them.44 Until recently, the prevailing 
theory within Europe was that with greater competition in the Internet access market, 
and with the regulatory authority ready to intervene should one of the behemoths of 
the Internet access market decide to interfere with the quality of service of its 
customers, there was no need for proscriptive regulatory intervention.  
In Europe, as in the US, institutional regulation has to date been employed to protect 
net neutrality. However, as the role of markets was more pronounced, it has 
traditionally taken a different form. Whereas the US model was direct regulation 
through command and control, as evidenced by the 2010 and 2015 Rules and the 
extensive litigation surrounding them, the European model was through a hybrid of 
self-regulation and competition regulation. This can most clearly be seen in Ofcom’s 
Net Neutrality Statement of 24 November 2011 where it was noted that “to date, the 
market has generally been an effective mechanism for delivering the benefits 
described above. Our approach to traffic management will therefore continue to rely 
primarily on there being effective competition amongst Internet Service Providers.”45  
These two competing regulatory models, Command and Control and Competition 
remain at the heart of the institutionalist approach to net neutrality. More recently, 
however, Europe’s reliance on competition regulation has seemed less secure. As we 
moved from traditional DSL lines to fibre-optic access the market narrowed. As a 
result European nations began to take steps to secure net neutrality through legal 
mandate. On 29 September 2010 a ministerial declaration from the Council of Europe 
stated that: 
Users should have the greatest possible access to Internet-based content, 
applications and services of their choice, whether or not they are offered free 
of charge, using suitable devices of their choice. Such a general principle, 
commonly referred to as network neutrality, should apply irrespective of the 
infrastructure or the network used for Internet connectivity.46  
It then went on to acknowledge that although  
Operators of electronic communication networks may have to manage Internet 
traffic [and] this management may relate to quality of service, the 
development of new services, network stability and resilience or combating 
                                                 
43 The proposed merger of BT and EE will reduce this further to a ‘big four’. See ‘Final Report of the 
Competition and Markets Authority on the anticipated acquisition by BT Group plc. of EE Limited’ (16 
January 2016). Available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/56992242ed915d4747000026/BT_EE_final_report.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 16). 
44 Ofcom, “Switching Broadband Provider” available at 
http://consumers.ofcom.org.uk/internet/broadband-switching/switching-broadband-provider/ (accessed 
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cybercrime.47 . . . exceptions to this principle should be considered with great 
circumspection and need to be justified by overriding public interests.48  
 
As well as the Council of Europe declaration, there were developments at the EU 
level. Two communications from the Commission opened up debate and consultation 
on EU policy for net neutrality. In April 2011, a communication from the 
Commission to Parliament and the Council entitled The Open Internet and Net 
Neutrality in Europe,49 noted that despite Art. 8(4)(g) of the Framework Directive50 
requiring national regulatory authorities to promote the interests of the citizens of the 
European Union by promoting the ability of end-users to access and distribute 
information or run applications and services of their choice, concerns had been raised 
about throttling of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing or video streaming by certain 
providers in France, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom 
and blocking or charging extra for the provision of voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP) services in mobile networks by certain mobile operators in Austria, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Romania.51 The Commission noted that the EU 
remained committed to “preserving the open and neutral character of the internet, 
taking full account of the will of the co-legislators now to enshrine net neutrality as a 
policy objective and regulatory principle to be promoted by national regulatory 
authorities”.52 The Commission also noted though that amendments made in the 2009 
Telecoms Reform Package were still being implemented by member states and so 
recommended no immediate action be taken, rather they would monitor the situation. 
The monitoring period ended in summer 2012. A study by the Body of European 
Regulators of European Communications (BEREC) found that 20% of all Internet 
users, and potentially up to half of EU mobile broadband users, had contracts that 
allowed their ISP to restrict services like VoIP or P2P. They further found that those 
fixed and mobile operators with contractual restrictions on P2P, 96% of fixed line 
providers and 88% of mobile providers, enforced them technically.53 As a result, the 
Commission launched a public consultation into transparency, switching, and Internet 
traffic management with the aim of preserving net neutrality. The public consultation 
stage closed on 15 October 2012, after which the Commission put together a series of 
packages on net neutrality and mobile roaming which led to the publication of the 
Connected Continent legislation package on 11 September 2013.54 Key amongst this 
package was the proposal for a Regulation laying down measures concerning the 
European single market for electronic communications and to achieve a Connected 
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Continent (the Telecoms Regulation).55 Although the proposed Regulation covered a 
lot of ground, including co-ordination of the Radio Spectrum market and mobile 
roaming agreements, it also provided for net neutrality through a number of 
provisions but primarily through chapter IV (Arts.21-29). As was noted in the 
explanatory notes to the draft: 
The obligation on providers to provide unhindered connection to all content, 
applications or services being accessed by end-users – also referred to as Net 
Neutrality – while regulating the use of traffic management measures by 
operators in respect of general internet access. At the same time, the legal 
framework for specialised services with enhanced quality is clarified.56  
Unfortunately, in a series of tripartite negotiations between the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament, these strong Net Neutrality provisions were sacrificed in 
order to gain agreement on other aspects of the Regulation. After receiving a strong 
endorsement by the Parliament at first Reading in April 2014, an agreement was 
reached with the Parliament on 9 July 2014. It was sent to the Council for agreement, 
and there it hit a hurdle. It was reported in March 2015 that the Council proposed an 
alternative set of net neutrality rules which “would establish a principle of ‘net 
neutrality’ but still allow telecoms groups to manage the flow of Internet traffic to 
ensure the network worked efficiently. They will also be able to agree deals with 
corporate and individual customers to provide faster Internet services — although the 
proposals make clear that these would not be allowed to impair the wider working of 
the Internet in any ‘material manner’”, in essence a two-speed Internet.57  
The final version of the Regulation as passed on 25 November 201558 gives support 
for only one aspect of net neutrality as explained by the second Recital: “The 
measures provided for in this Regulation respect the principle of technological 
neutrality, that is to say they neither impose nor discriminate in favour of the use of a 
particular type of technology.” The net neutrality provisions have been removed in 
favour of provisions technological neutrality, transparency and market regulation. The 
key provisions are now found in Arts. 3-5 and allied regulations. Article 3 pronounces 
that open Internet access safeguards ensure technological neutrality:  
End-users shall have the right to access and distribute information and content, 
use and provide applications and services, and use terminal equipment of their 
choice, irrespective of the end-user’s or provider’s location or the location, 
origin or destination of the information, content, application or service, via 
their internet access service. 
Note that there is no QoS requirement, although it may be argued that Art. 1(3) does 
appear to provide some form of net neutrality protection: “Providers of internet access 
services shall treat all traffic equally, when providing internet access services, without 
                                                 
55 COM(2013) 627 final. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/news-redirect/11950 (accessed 
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discrimination, restriction or interference, and irrespective of the sender and receiver, 
the content accessed or distributed, the applications or services used or provided, or 
the terminal equipment used.”  
This, however, is undermined by both Arts. 1(2): “Agreements between providers of 
internet access services and end-users on commercial and technical conditions and the 
characteristics of internet access services such as price, data volumes or speed, and 
any commercial practices conducted by providers of internet access services, shall not 
limit the exercise of the rights of end-users laid down in paragraph 1”; and the second 
part of 1(3):  
the first subparagraph shall not prevent providers of internet access services 
from implementing reasonable traffic management measures. In order to be 
deemed to be reasonable, such measures shall be transparent, non-
discriminatory and proportionate, and shall not be based on commercial 
considerations but on objectively different technical quality of service 
requirements of specific categories of traffic. Such measures shall not monitor 
the specific content and shall not be maintained for longer than necessary. 
To ensure these provisions are not abused, there are the transparency requirements of 
Art. 4 including that: 
 providers of internet access services shall ensure that any contract which 
includes internet access services specifies at least the following: (a) 
information on how traffic management measures applied by that provider 
could impact on the quality of the internet access services, on the privacy of 
end-users and on the protection of their personal data and (b) a clear and 
comprehensible explanation as to how any volume limitation, speed and other 
quality of service parameters may in practice have an impact on internet 
access services, and in particular on the use of content, applications and 
services.  
The idea here is that the market and consumer choice will play a major role in 
ensuring no abuse occurs. To this end, BEREC were tasked to produce draft 
guidelines to National Regulatory Authorities designed to ensure “compliance with 
the rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory treatment of traffic in the 
provision of internet access services and related end-users rights.” BEREC opened the 
draft guidelines to consultation and it has been reported that they have received in 
excess of 500,000 consumer responses to them.59 In addition, both Arts. 3 & 4 are 
backed up by the requirement that national regulatory authorities monitor service 
providers for compliance with the Regulation and the requirement of an annual report 
to BEREC.60 The final regulation, and the draft guidelines, have both been the subject 
of extensive criticism61 and there are early indicators that some service providers are 
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seeing this as a green light to introduce tiered services,62 a position that has come 
under criticism from, among others, Sir Tim Berners-Lee and Professor Lawrence 
Lessig.63 
This leaves two questions: why did the Council insist on those changes to the 
Regulation, and where will this leave net neutrality in Europe? The answer to the first 
is unclear. The Council likes to talk of the concept of remote medical care and even 
remote surgery where a surgeon in Frankfurt could carry out surgery remotely via the 
Internet in Bad Kissengen. This they suggest will only be possible if the surgeon can 
be assured of a high quality differentiated network connection. It is more likely, 
though, that pressure from major network operators, and the need to broker a deal on 
data roaming, were really behind the position of the Council. Where will this leave net 
neutrality in Europe? The short answer is exactly where it was before. A failure to 
enshrine net neutrality does not mean it goes away; it simply means that it is not 
enshrined by law. In the short term nothing will change, but over time network 
operators may, emboldened by the stops take in Council, apply more traffic controls 
and access controls, perhaps leading to a two-speed Internet. The timing of the 
Council intervention could not be worse, given the moves of the FCC to ensure net 
neutrality in the United States. Though, as we have seen, they too are likely to come 
under threat via the action of the petition of the USTA.    
It may be argued that the institutionalist approach has failed to adequately protect net 
neutrality. The US command and control approach has been struck down again and 
again by the courts as being ultra vires and it is likely that the United States Telecom 
Association v FCC & Ors application will lead to the same outcome once more.64 The 
command and control approach used by the FCC has become a game of regulatory 
whack-a-mole. The FCC passes a Rule or Order and the telecommunications 
companies challenge it. It seems clear that despite the efforts of the FCC to mandate 
network neutrality in the United States that there have been repeated violations of the 
principle including Comcast’s BitTorrent block,65 AT&T’s Face Time block66 and 
Verizon’s block on tethering apps.67 In fact, according to one report in the one month 
after the 2015 Rules took effect the FCC received around 2,000 consumer complaints 
around a number of net neutrality issues including slow speeds, high prices, and data 
caps.68 In the same period, European regulators have mostly relied upon competition 
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regulation, but as the BEREC report demonstrates, this is not working: 20% of all 
Internet users in the period in question, and potentially up to half of EU mobile 
broadband users, had contracts that allowed their ISP to restrict services like VoIP or 
P2P. Of those fixed and mobile operators with contractual restrictions on P2P, 96% of 
fixed line providers and 88% of mobile providers enforced them technically.69 The 
failure of the institutionalist approach suggests that instead of continuing to play this 
narrow and failing game, regulators should reconsider how best to regulate for net 
neutrality. In the next section, we propose an alternative: a principled approach. 
3. A Principled Approach  
In his seminal book, Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace,70 Lawrence Lessig  argues 
that code, as the architecture of the Internet, is the most powerful regulator of activity 
within cyberspace. His theory centres on the idea that Internet users are regulated by 
four constraints: law, social norms, the market, and architecture71 Of those, 
architecture, according to Lessig, is most able to control users’ behaviour, and their 
experience of the Internet. Lessig even asserts that “[t]he code embeds certain values 
or makes certain values impossible”.72 As such, the design of the Internet’s code can 
be changed to further a certain vision of what we believe the Internet’s purpose should 
be.  
Part of this code includes the way data is transmitted over the network. As has been 
seen, the network was originally designed around the “end-to-end principle”, whereby 
bits of information are transported between intelligent terminals through dumb 
pipes.73 Less metaphorically, this means that ISPs, as providers of the network, have 
no knowledge of the content of the data they are transferring, this content being 
decipherable only by its sender and receiver. The end-to-end principle has long been 
held as guarantor of an open Internet, and as conducive to a competitive market for 
Internet content, relying on the possibility of anyone to be an innovator. When 
broadband Internet arrived on the US market in the early 2000s, Lemley and Lessig 
identified the ability of cable companies to bundle ISP service as a threat to the 
principle of end-to-end, in that the control over innovation would shift from a variety 
of users and programmers to a single network owner.74 
Through the evolution of technology, and justified by the need to rationalise the 
exponential increase in data transfers, ISPs have developed traffic management 
practices, whereby they are able to inspect the content of the data they are 
transporting, in order to assign to it a certain transfer speed or priority over other types 
of data. These practices exemplify how the architecture of the Internet can control the 
digital environment: by exercising control over the speed at which data is transferred, 
ISPs influence the user’s experience of the Internet. This is the current threat to the 
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end-to-end principle that the Internet must tackle. As previously discussed, it has been 
found for example that ISPs in Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Romania blocked or charged extra costs for the provision of voice-over internet 
protocol (VoIP) services in mobile networks while ISPs in France, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom were found to be throttling of P2P file-
sharing or video streaming.75 This is a clear instance of control by ISPs over the use 
we make of the Internet and our experience of it. ISPs may control behaviour in 
response to law to a further extent than the law intends. In Ireland, the largest ISP, 
Eircom, includes in its terms of use for broadband users a policy on offensive speech: 
“Customers may not use the Facility to create, host or transmit offensive or obscene 
material, or engage in activities, which are likely to cause offence to others on any 
grounds including, but not limited to race, creed, or sex.”76 This language goes 
beyond the words of s. 2(1) of the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act 1989, 
which makes it an offence to utter or publish statements that “are threatening, abusive 
or insulting and are intended or, having regard to all the circumstances, are likely to 
stir up hatred.” Eircom, through these terms of use, is thus creating a new standard of 
offensive speech in cyberspace, unique to its customers.77  
3. 1. The Value of a Neutral Internet 
This kind of code design has crucial implications for individual rights. In order to 
carry out their traffic management practices, ISPs rely on Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI) – the detailed examination of the contents of the data being transferred. This 
examination of what users send through the network has the potential to impede 
individuals’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression, and to distort fair 
competition by prioritising certain types of communications. 
These activities are threats to the fundamental value of the network. The importance 
of the Internet today is such that it may be classified as a public good. As the IFLA 
argues in its Trend Report, “in a context where Internet access is swiftly becoming an 
indispensable economic and social enabler within a modern hyper-connected world, 
without Internet access it becomes increasingly challenging to take full advantage of 
existing human rights”.78 Indeed, the Internet creates a huge and diverse community 
that provides its members with an open platform to inform and express themselves, 
communicate, exchange, organise and grow social movements, and more generally 
allow them to “engage on equal footing in economic, social and political activities.”79 
It has become a fundamental element of democratic participation. An unprecedented 
number of people are able to access the Internet, which provides them with a 
discourse platform with a reach much more extensive than that offered by traditional 
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media. Not only does the Internet provide easy and free access to information sources, 
it also allows people to contribute to debates in a way not possible before: “With the 
removal of spatial and temporal bounds, and the freedom to participate anonymously 
or pseudonymously, the internet facilitates town-hall type gatherings and the creation 
of communities that might not otherwise have formed.”80 Allowing everyone to vote 
is not enough for democracy to be realised – individuals must have the opportunity to 
voice their opinions, put them up to challenge by others, and exchange ideas. And the 
less costly it is to do so in terms of time and resources, the better it is. The Internet 
provides for that, and in addition is an indispensable vector of participation in more 
routine, yet still crucial, activities. One needs only think of the amount of daily 
transactions and personal business or social activities we carry out through the 
Internet. Almost all dealings with our banks, telephone companies, electricity and gas 
providers, gyms, universities, etc., are made online. Without an Internet connection, 
we are automatically shut off from easy, streamlined access to these essential services.  
Historically, the Internet was regarded simply as a new communications medium, 
prone to influence by market forces and profit considerations. Even today, some still 
take this view, and advocate for leaving it to the hands of commercial entities to 
define its place in our society.81 But the Internet has such an important role for all 
modern individuals that it should be considered essential for the protection of human 
rights, and access to it should be treated as a public good: it serves functions from 
which no one should be excluded, and whose consumption by one person should not 
reduce consumption by another.82 The problem is that ISPs, the providers of access to 
the Internet, are commercial entities pursuing the maximisation of their profits, and so 
are not concerned about the provision of unfiltered and diverse information.83 When 
ISPs “manage traffic” on the Internet, they “only do so in properly utilitarian manner 
for their benefit” – their priority is to utilise their network in the most efficient way, 
without regard to welfare and humanitarian concerns.84 And because they are not 
public bodies, they are not subject to the same standards of human rights protection 
than public bodies.85 In most countries, private actors are not subject to obligations to 
protect human rights – in the UK for example, the Human Rights Act 1998 explicitly 
provides that only public bodies are bound by the Act and expected to respect its 
provisions.86 We can thus only rely on governments to police the behaviour of private 
entities. Emily Laidlaw explains the dangerous importance of “privately owned 
internet information gatekeepers (IIGs)” – of which ISPs are an important type – in 
facilitating the internet’s democratic potential.  
The role of such regulators has not yet been settled, and, as of yet, they do not 
have any democratic or public interest mandate that assures the Internet’s 
democratic potential is being facilitated. If the Internet is a democratising 
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force, we inevitably at present must rely on these IIGs for the realisation of 
this aspect of its capacity.87 
Thus, in order to preserve the Internet’s openness and to expand its access, regulations 
should be enacted to prevent ISPs from carrying out illegitimate discrimination of 
certain types of data. These regulations should pursue the goal of net neutrality, a 
fundamental principle of an open Internet, according to which “data packets on the 
Internet should be moved impartially, without regard to content, destination or 
source”.88 The Council of Europe recognises net neutrality as a “key enabler of human 
rights”,89 noting that “both net neutrality and openness facilitate inclusion, 
transparency, fair competition and non-discrimination with the goal of fostering 
participation, cooperative creativity and the full enjoyment of human rights”.90 
Indeed, net neutrality furthers the “edges-empowering” character of the Internet, 
placing the end users in control of their communications, which allows them to send 
and access whatever kind of content they wish, without fear of an undesirable third 
party scrutinising their activities. We now turn to an assessment of how net neutrality 
preserves the Internet’s capacity to foster participative democracy by protecting 
privacy and freedom of expression. We will also see that net neutrality is crucial to 
protect innovation and competition.  
3. 2. Net Neutrality and Privacy 
Net neutrality is necessary for the protection of privacy rights. Enshrined by Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the right to respect for private 
and family life establishes that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.” Traffic management and QoS practices 
will apply deep packet inspection which seeks to “read” some content information. 
Based upon this “reading” content may be blocked, throttled, or used for profiling. 
Whatever the purpose, the fundamental problem lies in the fact that if ISPs apply 
these kinds of policies, personal and even confidential information may be 
interrogated by the ISPs applying QoS principles. This conflicts with the right to 
confidentiality of communications,91 and with “the right to respect for…private and 
family life…and correspondence.”92 The Council of Europe draws a useful analogy 
with the traditional postal services to illustrate how pervasive such an inspection is: it 
would undoubtedly seem unacceptable if a mailman was able to open every letter he 
had to carry, and, based on their content, decide at what speed these would reach their 
recipient, or even which of these would simply not get there.93 One would feel deeply 
violated if private communications were scrutinised in this fashion, and so in the same 
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way, deep packet inspection for reasons other than avoiding congestion on the 
network is an infringement on privacy.  
Koops and Slujis evaluated the extent to which ISPs’ traffic management practices 
could be an infringement of Article 8.94 After recognising that “[i]f DPI is used and 
thus correspondence is intercepted by the ISP, there is a clear interference with users’ 
right to privacy”,95 they conclude from their analysis that a finding of violation of 
Article 8 will be very rare, and will depend on “the kind of traffic that is managed and 
the reasons for this; the duration and scope of network management;…and the extent 
to which public authorities have been involved”.96 They notably argue that Article 8 
will be violated only when traffic management takes the form of blocking, or when 
degrading or prioritising traffic is based on sender or recipient information. The thing 
is, these do happen. Governments and courts already order the blocking of a number 
of pornographic and file-sharing websites97 – this requires ISPs to be able to identify 
who attempts to access those websites and to impede them from doing so. Moreover, 
ISPs’ discrimination practices hinder the use of encrypted browsing, which “prevents 
internet providers from injecting ads into the pages you view and prevents them from 
logging your activities to sell to marketers…Without net neutrality, there’s no telling 
what privacy-enabling tools will become unusable at the whim of internet 
providers.”98  
It may be argued that traffic management methods can be used by ISPs without 
inspecting the content of communications, rather only inspecting the type of material 
carried. Such a method would use the IPv6 header to signify whether the packet 
should get priority treatment, without reading the content itself. Saying that this would 
not violate privacy because it does not access any information transmitted by users is 
a misconception. When Paul Ohm suggests “Net non-scrutiny” as an alternative to 
Net neutrality, which would allow ISPs to look at the TCP port numbers on packets 
but not to carry out deep packet inspection, he argues that “scrutiny without handling 
does not violate Net neutrality and handling without scrutiny does not necessarily 
implicate privacy”.99 This relies on only one aspect of privacy, focused on privacy of 
communications. One should consider privacy more broadly, as the ability to access 
any content with an assured transmission speed, that does not vary according to 
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whether the user is reading an online newspaper or streaming videos. Affording 
priority to certain types of content has a pervasive influence on one’s freedom to 
choose the type of material one wishes to consult on the Internet.    
This question of privacy is becoming increasingly topical, as the Investigatory Powers 
Bill comes closer to enactment. If passed, the Bill would grant powers of mass 
surveillance by authorising bulk interception of communications. Without a strong 
commitment to net neutrality enshrined in legislation, the Bill will grant such powers 
without any technical constraint on the ability to snoop into individual 
communications – widespread interception and examination of content will be made 
much easier by the lack of neutrality in ISPs’ practices. Net neutrality is thus 
necessary to protect basic principles of privacy, and to ensure that technology is not 
an aid to unacceptable intrusion into citizens’ communications. 
3. 3. Net Neutrality and Freedom of Expression 
Net neutrality plays an equally important role in protecting freedom of expression. 
Article 10 of the ECHR ensures the right “to receive and impart ideas and information 
without interference”. The Internet today is possibly the most important platform for 
expression, imposing no technical restriction on what people can say, and allowing for 
wide-reaching dissemination of opinions and debate. As the Council of Europe 
observes, “[i]n our current information society, the ability to freely receive and impart 
ideas and information and to fully participate in the democratic life is truly reliant on 
the nature of one’s Internet connection”.100 While it may be contended that an Internet 
connection is not mandatory to “impart ideas and information”, today it is 
undoubtedly the most efficient medium. Before we could make use of the Internet, 
public discussions were held physically, in town halls or public squares. The people 
who made the effort to come down there were very engaged and politically conscious 
people, or maybe frustrated citizens who wished to voice their anger. Political debates 
were mainly held on TV or on the radio, gathering politicians and public figures, but 
rarely ordinary citizens. Today, the Internet allows anyone with a connection to 
participate in such discussions and debates in real time. This is a formidable evolution 
towards a more inclusive and participative democracy. The Internet also affords its 
users a freedom to participate in an unrestricted fashion.  Thanks to the anonymity 
and pseudonymity offered online, and thanks to an open design where censure is hard 
to execute, people are free to engage in open debates where all opinions are pitted 
against each other in an unrestricted marketplace of ideas where discourse can elevate 
knowledge and reasoning. This open design also creates the opportunity to challenge 
harmful opinions to show their flaws, rather than outright banning them from 
expression and letting them retrench in dark corners where they can grow and 
reinforce each other around hatred.  
Having a neutral Internet, where ISPs cannot inspect the content of communications 
and speech, prevents a strong chilling effect on speech coming from people knowing 
they are constantly watched and monitored. Al Franken has called net neutrality the 
“free speech issue of our time”, because he believes that “the Internet is the public 
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square of the 21st century.”101 Similarly, Brown and Marsden point out that “traffic 
management techniques affect not only high speed, high money content but, by 
extension, all other content too.”102 As the most important communication platform, 
the Internet requires the most extensive efforts be put in to protect freedom of 
expression. And ISPs, as providers of access to this platform, should not be able to 
use techniques to encroach on freedom of speech. Regulators have a responsibility to 
provide and secure access to such a platform to enable people to realise their free 
speech rights. As Marvin Ammori argued in his seminal article “First Amendment 
Architecture”, realising the aim of the First Amendment requires more than “negative 
liberty”, whereby the government refrains from any involvement in speech. Under 
negative liberty, government cannot ensure access to digital spaces because it would 
be making decisions about who can speak that should be left to the private market.103 
This is a fundamental misconception about the nature of the right to freedom of 
expression. In order to be enjoyed freely by all, this right requires more than a lack of 
interference in people's exercise of it – it requires the development and maintaining of 
an “architecture” designed to provide spaces for this exercise. If we leave it to ISPs 
and private entities to decide what kind of content can and cannot be delivered, or 
who will have easy and streamlined access to platforms of expression and who will 
not, we effectively shut out a proportion of the population from access to necessary 
spaces for expression. The government is thus required to positively act, through net 
neutrality regulation, to ensure these spaces exist and are open to everyone, in the 
same way. 
Beyond the issue of the provision of free speech architecture, we must see that by 
preventing certain services and information to be diffused to Internet users, traffic 
management techniques such as filtering and blocking have a feel of censorship. Mac 
Sithigh gives the example of when the pro-choice group NARAL was refused 
permission to use a “short code” SMS facility provided by large carrier Verizon in the 
U.S., to illustrate “the dangers of allowing unregulated service providers to pick and 
choose between content providers, thus regulating, in practice, not just the 
communicative rights of the provider but the actual content received by the 
consumer.”104 Although the NARAL dispute only concerns a refusal to issue a short 
code and thus does not touch upon differential treatment network traffic, it efficiently 
illustrates both the capacity and willingness of telecoms service providers to refuse 
access to the network as it suits them, without any legal basis. Already highly 
controversial on its own, censorship becomes even more controversial when it is 
effected by private actors, here ISPs. Marsden shows that Deep Packet Inspection is 
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increasingly used both by Western ISPs and in countries with more autocratic 
governments. It happens through co-regulation: 
The government sets the rules and the ISPs are allowed a broad measure of 
independence as to process to achieve the results the government sets out. This 
is controversial in that it passes powers to control freedom of expression into 
private hands, often without the constitutional protections that govern public 
authority intervention and censorship105  
It is crucial to strip ISPs of their ability to discriminate and censor, so that such a 
dangerous power is not exercised by non-accountable actors. 
Just as with privacy, the importance of protecting freedom of expression through net 
neutrality is highly topical when one considers the imminent enactment of the 
Investigatory Powers Bill. In an era of mass surveillance, where intelligence agencies 
have widespread power and legitimacy to watch and monitor everyone’s 
communications and activities on the Internet, ISPs being co-opted by the government 
to maintain a backdoor into these communications is highly dangerous. Leaving ISPs 
the ability to inspect content maintains this backdoor. The chilling effect on speech in 
this instance is even stronger: knowing one’s communications are watched by law 
enforcers makes people highly reticent to share “unconventional” or “inconvenient” 
opinions, out of fear of ending up on the records of “people to watch”. This is 
exacerbated in countries with autocratic governments, where safeguards against 
arbitrary law enforcement may not be as strong.  
In comparison, a non-neutral Internet can be an Internet of censure, where scrutiny of 
speech and communications would chill the expression of contentious views, thereby 
excluding minority views and reinforcing majority opinion.106 Net neutrality thus 
enables freedom of expression by removing barriers to the transmission of 
communications and by making it impossible for “inconvenient” opinions to be 
arbitrarily censored, or unexpressed in the first place. 107  
3. 4. Net Neutrality, Innovation and Competition 
Net neutrality also has a vital role to play in innovation and fair competition, and of 
freedom to conduct business, as enshrined in Article 16 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.108 The market for Internet content promotes creative innovation 
by imposing low barriers to entry. This is thanks in great part to the end-to-end 
architecture of the Internet, which creates “an infrastructure fundamentally open to the 
creative contributions of a multitude of innovators, be they hardware designers, 
network operators, application creators, or content authors.”109 However, traffic 
management practices raise these barriers by making it harder for new entrant content 
creators to distribute the product of their work at an acceptable level of quality. 
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Practices such as preferential agreements, whereby ISPs reserve specific portions of 
bandwidth to certain content providers to provide better quality service, harm content 
providers that do not have the means to pay for such agreements, thereby 
discouraging innovation and indirectly harming consumers.110  
In 2014, the largest US cable and broadband provider, Comcast, entered into an 
agreement with Netflix whereby Netflix would pay Comcast for faster and more 
reliable access to Comcast’s subscribers.111 The agreement was justified by the fact 
that Netflix traffic uses a particularly high amount of the network’s capacity, and so it 
should be asked to pay for its content to get to customers in a reliable way. Fair 
enough – Netflix has the necessary size and revenue to be able to pay for this, and 
Comcast subscribers will be happy to use Netflix at high speed. The problem is that 
this is profoundly detrimental for competition amongst content providers. By 
establishing that content providers are able to pay ISPs – probably a lot of money – to 
afford better transmission to their content, this effectively gives an enormous 
advantage to established players on the market which have the means to pay these 
sums. In the end, this prevents smaller, new entrants on the market from competing 
with the big ones. Cooper and Brown argue that “discrimination generally reduces 
application developers’ incentives to innovate because it vests the control over which 
applications succeed or fail in the hands of network operators”.112 This discrimination 
leaves them “at the mercy of infrastructure owners, forcing them into business 
arrangements that would restrict their options.”113 It has been argued by ISPs that 
preferential agreements are what users want, since it would allow for more reliable 
transmission speeds in accessing high-volume content. But content providers who 
cannot pay the kind of money that Netflix paid to Comcast, such as start-ups, will get 
stuck in the slow lane.114 While a more reliable connection is undeniably desirable for 
the content’s users, it should not come at the expense of access to future innovation 
and exploration of “evolutionary paths”. One should also not forget that if content 
providers are charged for accessing the network’s fast lane, consumers are the ones 
who will foot the bill. This may be acceptable to the ISP’s customers who use the 
content in question, but it is not acceptable to make consumers who subscribe to other 
ISPs, or who may want to use another content provider, to pay for this.  
Preserving the end-to-end architecture of the Internet is thus crucial to promote 
innovation and to leave doors open to the next generation of content providers. As 
Lessig explained seventeen years ago, “[t]his end-to-end design frees innovation from 
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the past. It’s an architecture that makes it hard for a legacy business to control how 
the market will evolve.”115 This is the reason why Franken argues that net neutrality is 
“what prevents deep-pocketed corporations from buying an unfair advantage over 
new competitors.”116  
As we have already shown, some mobile ISPs use traffic management to reduce the 
quality of VoIP services, which directly compete with their telephony services.117 
VoIP users typically pay much lower charges per minute, and are therefore “much 
less profitable than dedicated phone subscribers”.118 This is highly disruptive of fair 
competition in the Internet content market. It renders VoIP services unusable or less 
reliable in the eyes of consumers, denying them access to novel services which could 
make their lives better. While Renda argues that ISPs’ position on the market has 
been hurt by services such as Skype or WhatsApp, and thus that they should be 
allowed to compensate by charging more for better service quality,119 he overlooks 
the fact that Skype and WhatsApp rely upon high network quality and so are highly 
dependent on ISPs’ services, while mobile network operators do not depend on them 
for their telephony services. It is true that these services use up an important share of 
bandwidth, yet it should not be their role to contribute to ISPs’ necessary investments 
in expanding the network. If Virgin or BT need to develop their infrastructure further, 
to provide better network access, it should be on them; not on content developers 
whose concern should be creating new innovative services, and nothing else. Each 
player in the market should concern itself about improving its own services, not about 
trying to find someone to blame for the need to improve these services. Again, putting 
responsibility on content developers to contribute to investments in infrastructure, by 
asking them to pay for a reliable transmission of their services, will inevitably lead to 
a fundamentally unfair advantage given to big, rich content providers. Although the 
amount of throttling of VoIP services has certainly reduced since BEREC revealed 
these practices, they represent a worrying willingness by ISPs to discriminate or de-
prioritise certain services for their own commercial advantage, and measures should 
be taken to ensure that ISPs do not have the power to repeat this in the future. 
The last issue we ought to deal with is that of zero-rating, a practice by ISPs which 
consists in excluding preferred content from data caps, so that downloading costs 
amount to zero in consumers’ bills.120 Content providers and ISPs enter into an 
agreement, whereby content providers pay ISPs to make their content available to the 
ISP’s consumers at no cost. An example of this practice is Facebook’s FreeBasics 
(originally Internet.org), a walled garden which includes only a handful of websites, 
not the whole Internet, and which is intended to “provide people with access to useful 
services on their mobile phones in markets where internet access may be less 
affordable”.121 FreeBasics was recently banned in India following powerful 
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mobilisation by civil society against what was deemed a threat to net neutrality. 
Indeed, FreeBasics effectively allowed Facebook to monopolise a system of 
information by retaining the power to decide what services Indian consumers could 
have access to. Zero-rating has been banned in various other countries, such as 
Canada, Brazil or Slovenia122, as it constitutes an important threat to fair competition 
and innovation, and to net neutrality. As Tim Wu has argued, the fact that content 
creators do not have to pay anything in order to make their content available to users’ 
ISPs facilitates their entry on the market, and promotes a wide array of choice for 
consumers.123 If we allowed ISPs to charge content providers, this would lead to what 
Wu calls “fragmentation”, whereby certain content would only be available through 
certain ISPs, thus creating “multiple Internets”.124 The “[p]otential welfare losses 
could also be significant as consumers would find themselves foreclosed from 
accessing content available only on rival service providers, and content providers 
would find themselves unable to reach certain segments of the population captive to 
service providers with whom no agreement had been reached”125 Zero-rating is thus a 
practice that runs counter to an open and neutral Internet. 
The challenge that these various practices pose to the end-to-end architecture and to 
innovation on the Internet was identified and explained by Mark Lemley and 
Lawrence Lessig fifteen years ago, when unfair practices by network owners first 
arose: 
 An architecture that maximizes the opportunity for innovation maximizes 
innovation. An architecture that creates powerful strategic actors with 
control over the network and what can connect to it threatens innovation. 
No doubt these strategic actors might choose to behave in a pro-
competitive manner. There is no guarantee that they will interfere to stifle 
innovation. But without competition or regulation to restrict them, we 
should not assume that they will somehow decide to act in the public 
interest.126 
The threat to innovation that Lessig identified has in those past fifteen years been 
pushed back by efforts to keep net neutrality alive on the Internet. But it is coming 
back today, and it is bigger than ever, reinforced by arguments about the need to 
expand the network. Net neutrality-enforcing regulation is thus necessary to level the 
playing field, not simply for reasons of fairness to new entrants, but most importantly 
for consumer and citizen welfare around the world.  
4. The Importance of the Principled Approach  
Having established that network neutrality is necessary for a rights-friendly, open and 
innovative network, it remains to be shown that regulation through mandated network 
neutrality provisions is required to protect this principle. Research findings show that 
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ISPs do currently carry out traffic management and blocking practices that are 
detrimental to many kinds of services. The threat to network neutrality is thus real, 
and something has to be done about it. Hahn and Wallsten, in an article positioned 
against net neutrality, argue that competition law and antitrust enforcement are 
sufficient to promote innovation and ensure fair practices.127 But that is simply not 
true. Arguing so relies on the premise that consumers will merely choose the ISP that 
carries out the least discrimination. This is overly simplistic. It further assumes full 
capacity of consumers to, first, realise and understand the implications of 
discrimination practices, and second, switch ISPs at no cost and with ease. But 
consumers have much less agency capacity than that, and most do not care as much 
about non-discrimination as lawyers do. Cooper and Brown show that ‘”in practice, 
most consumers have difficulty finding and understanding traffic management 
disclosures”,128 and that the role of traffic management in switching decisions is 
secondary. It is thus crucial, in order to protect fundamental rights and promote 
innovation, to recognise positive obligations on governments to protect network 
neutrality, and to enact specific legislation to that effect. 
It is important that new legislation does not repeat the mistakes of institutionalist 
command and control or market regulation. Legislation and regulation in this field 
must be based upon rights-based principles of privacy, freedom of expression and the 
freedom to conduct business. We must stop imagining the Internet as a 
communications media and start to see it for what it truly is: a common good, or 
rather common space, which is at the heart of our modern democratic society. The 
right to network neutrality should be seen as just that, a right based on its fundamental 
role in supporting and delivering other fundamental rights. Network neutrality should 
only be restrictable on the grounds set out in the fundamental rights framework not for 
commercial grounds or for QoS principles. That is not to say ISPs and other network 
providers should not be able to charge more to make use of their network with excess 
profits raised being reinvested in building network capacity. We must acknowledge 
that technologies such as VoD streaming and VoIP have put extreme strain on overall 
network capacity. What cannot be allowed, on the principled approach, is the 
treatment of some forms of data being different to other forms of data.   
The Internet is a powerful enabler of social and economic integration, almost 
indispensable in order to carry out some of the most basic activities in our 
contemporary digitised world. The benefits people derive from using the Internet 
result from its open architecture, its easiness of access, and the plurality of content it 
provides. These characteristics of the Internet should thus be protected through the 
positive promotion of network neutrality. Counting on market competition to keep 
ISPs’ practices in line is simply unrealistic, which is why mandated network 
neutrality provisions are necessary. Although “the Internet thrives on lack of 
regulation”,129 regulating net neutrality is one of the rare instances of government 
intervention that promotes, rather than impedes, freedom and innovation, freedom of 
expression and possibly also online privacy. 
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